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Abstract. In this paper I argue that there are two kinds of epistemic reasons. 
one kind is irreducibly first personal – what I call deliberative reasons. The other 
kind is third personal – what I call theoretical reasons. I argue that attending 
to this distinction illuminates a  host of problems in epistemology in general 
and in religious epistemology in particular. These problems include (a) the way 
religious experience operates as a reason for religious belief, (b) how we ought to 
understand religious testimony, (c) how religious authority can be justified, (d) 
the problem of religious disagreement, and (e) the reasonableness of religious 
conversion.
I. tHe DIStINCtIoN betWeeN FIrSt PerSoN AND tHIrD 
PerSoN reASoNS
1.1.
I  assume that believing p is a  state in which I  have settled for myself 
whether p. An epistemic reason is something on the basis of which I can 
settle for myself whether p in so far as my goal is truth, not benefit or 
some other practical or moral aim. I want to argue that there are two 
kinds of epistemic reasons, one irreducibly first personal, the other third 
personal, and that attending to the distinction illuminates a  host of 
philosophical problems, including several that have special importance 
for philosophy of religion.
What I mean by theoretical reasons for believing p are facts that are 
logically or probabilistically connected to the truth of p. They are facts 
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(or propositions) about states of the world or experiences which, taken 
together, give a cumulative case for or against the fact that p (or the truth 
of p).1 They are not intrinsically connected to believing. We call them 
reasons because a  reasonable person who comes to believe them and 
grasps their logical relations to p will see them as reasons for p. They can 
be shared with others – laid out on the table, so they are third personal. 
They are relevant from anyone’s point of view. In fact, they do not require 
a  point of view to be reasons. The connections between theoretical 
reasons and what they are reasons for are among the facts of the universe. 
Theoretical reasons aggregate and can be used in bayesian calculations. 
What we call evidence is most naturally put in the category of theoretical 
reasons, although the notion of evidence is multiply ambiguous.2 but 
when I mention evidence in this paper, I will mean facts that are in the 
category of theoretical reasons.
In contrast, what I  mean by deliberative reasons have an essential 
connection to me and only to me in my deliberations about whether p. 
Deliberative reasons connect me to getting the truth of p, whereas 
theoretical reasons connect facts about the world with the truth of p. 
Deliberative reasons do not simply provide me a weightier reason for p 
than they provide others. They are not reasons for other persons at all. 
They are irreducibly first personal.
to see the distinction I have in mind, consider experience as a reason 
for belief. If you have an experience, the fact that you have it is a theoretical 
reason for believing a variety of propositions. You can tell me about your 
experience, and if I believe what you tell me, I can then refer to the fact 
that you had the experience as a reason to believe whatever it supports. 
You and I can both refer to the fact that you had the experience as a reason 
to believe something, and so can anybody else who is aware of the fact that 
you had the experience. The fact that the experience occurred is therefore 
a theoretical reason. It is on the table for all to consider, and all can consider 
its logical and probabilistic connections to other facts about the world. 
However, you are in a different position than I am with respect to your 
experience because you not only grasp the fact that you had the experience; 
1 In this paper I do not distinguish facts from true propositions. If there is a difference, 
the argument of this paper can be easily amended.
2 For an excellent survey of the different senses of evidence, see Thomas Kelly’s entry, 
“evidence,” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries).
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in addition, you and you alone had the experience. That experience 
affects many of your reasoning processes, emotional responses, and the 
way you come to have or give up certain beliefs directly, and that is quite 
proper. In contrast, the fact that you had the experience is something you 
and I and many other people can come to believe. my way of describing 
the contrast is that your experience gives you a  deliberative reason to 
form certain beliefs, whereas the fact that the experience occurred gives 
anybody a theoretical reason to form certain beliefs.3 Anybody can form 
the belief that you had the experience, thereby accessing that fact, but 
nobody but you can have your experience. 
Another type of deliberative reason is what are loosely called intuitions 
in one of its senses. I will not attempt an account of intuition, but what 
I  have in mind is, very roughly, something internal to the mind that 
responds with an answer to a question, often as a response to a concrete 
case. For example, if a fat man is stuck in the mouth of a cave, is it morally 
permissible to blow him out of the cave to save yourself and the other 
speelunkers from drowning in the rising tide? my intuition might be 
no, but perhaps yours is yes. I  have no position on the strength of an 
intuition of this kind as a reason to believe what the intuition supports. 
maybe it is strong, maybe it is not. but in so far as it is a reason at all, it 
is a deliberative reason. my intuitions are mine alone, and they give me 
but not you a particular kind of reason for certain beliefs. but again, the 
fact that I have an intuition can be put out on the table. I can tell you that 
my intuition is such and such, and that then becomes a theoretical reason 
supporting some position. So the fact that most people think that Gettier 
cases are not cases of knowledge is a reason for anyone to reject a theory 
that has the consequence that the believer knows in a Gettier situation, 
but your own intuition about such cases is a reason for you alone to draw 
certain conclusions. Intuitions, then, are like experiences. The intuition 
and the experience provide the agent with first person reasons to believe 
something, but the fact that the experience occurred or that the intuition 
is what it is can be treated as evidence, as a  theoretical reason for the 
truth of some proposition. 
3 my use of the terms “theoretical” and “deliberative” is not essential to the contrast 
I am making, but the terms call attention to a difference in function that I find helpful.
lINDA ZAGZebSKI288
I propose that there is another important deliberative reason that is 
more basic for us than any theoretical reasons we can identify. We can see 
the need for such a reason by reflecting on the need for a link between 
third person reasons and something in myself. Theoretical reasons do 
not operate as reasons for me to believe anything until I  take them on 
board. but my taking a certain set of theoretical reasons for p as reasons 
to believe p is not sufficient in itself to make it likely that p is true. That 
is because my taking a set of theoretical reasons to be reasons to believe 
p is irrelevant to the actual connection between those reasons and p unless 
I have taken them properly – properly identified the facts, figured out 
the correct logical and probabilistic relations between those facts and p, 
have appreciated the significance of individual facts, and have not left 
anything out. but my reasons to believe that depend upon the more basic 
belief that my faculties are trustworthy. And that raises the question of 
what reasons I have to believe that my faculties are trustworthy. It has 
been pointed out by others that any such reasons are circular. I have no 
way of telling that my faculties in general get me to the truth without 
using those faculties. 
A reasonable response to the phenomenon of epistemic circularity 
is epistemic self-trust.4 I  am not arguing here that no other response 
is reasonable (although it is my position that no other response is as 
reasonable). but I am claiming that it is reasonable to believe my faculties 
are generally trustworthy, and it is reasonable to dispel doubt about the 
trustworthiness of my faculties or hold such doubt at bay, a doubt that 
naturally arises upon reflection about the phenomenon of epistemic 
circularity. I think that means that in addition to including the belief that 
I  am generally trustworthy, self-trust includes an affective component, 
a component of feeling trusting. That is because doubt is partly affective, 
and it takes an affective state to dispel it. It is in virtue of self-trust – a state 
that is partly affective, that I take theoretical reasons I identify to point to 
the truth of some proposition p, and I am reasonable in doing so. 
I  said above that a  reason to believe p is a  state in virtue of which 
it is reasonable to think some proposition p is true. It so, self-trust 
4 See richard Foley, Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others (Cambridge university 
Press, 2001) and William Alston, Beyond Justification: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation, 
(Cornell university Press, 2005). 
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is a  reason because it is in virtue of self-trust that I  believe that what 
I take to be theoretical reasons for believing p are truth-indicators, and 
that is a  reasonable thing to do. Self-trust is a  reason, but a  reason of 
a distinctively first personal kind. It is a second order reason because it 
is a reason to believe that I have properly identified theoretical reasons 
for a  belief. The way self-trust gives me a  deliberative reason to think 
I  am properly connected to theoretical reasons shows that there are 
deliberative reasons that are more basic for me than any theoretical 
reasons I can identify. of course, they are not more basic than theoretical 
reasons, which are facts of the universe. but they are more basic than my 
use of any theoretical reasons in deliberations about what the truth is. 
Deliberative reasons can therefore be first order reasons like 
experience or intuition, or second order reasons like self-trust. I  want 
to argue next that trust in myself (a  deliberative reason) can give me 
a reason to trust others (another deliberative reason). So a deliberative 
reason can be a reason to have other deliberative reasons. 
How does self-trust give me a reason to trust others? my position is that 
if, in believing in a way I trust, I come to believe that others have the same 
faculties I trust in myself, then given the a priori principle that I ought to 
treat like cases alike, I have a reason to trust their faculties. If I reasonably 
trust their faculties, I have a reason to believe the deliverances of their 
faculties. trust in someone else gives me a deliberative reason to believe 
some proposition p because my reason is based on their similarity to me 
and my trust in myself.5
If I  am right that trust is partly an affective state, and if I  am also 
right that trust can give me a  reason to believe p, then a  state that is 
partly affective can give me a  reason to believe p. This is an epistemic 
reason, not a practical or moral reason. I think that there are probably 
other affective states that are deliberative reasons for belief. one is the 
emotion of admiration. I may epistemically admire someone and trust 
that admiration upon reflection. Admiration for a person can give me 
a reason to think that she has the truth in some domain that includes p, 
and it can give me a reason to try to imitate her in a way that includes 
5 I defend the argument of this paragraph in detail in Epistemic Authority: A Theory of 
Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief, based on my 2010 Wilde lectures and my 2011 
Kaminski lectures (manuscript in progress), chap. 3.
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coming to believe p. In that case my admiration for her is a deliberative 
reason to believe p. There are no doubt theoretical reasons to admire her, 
but those are not the reasons for believing p.6 
Deliberative reasons to believe p because of trust or admiration for 
another person are not necessarily reasons to think that the other person 
has theoretical reasons for p. of course, it often happens that a person 
who has the truth whether p also has theoretical reasons to believe p, but 
my reason to think someone has the truth whether p is not the same as 
reason to think that she has theoretical reasons to believe p. even if she 
has theoretical reasons for p, that is not what I have reason to believe. 
Deliberative reasons like trust and admiration are higher order reasons 
to think that I or someone else has the truth whether p, and therefore 
has reason to believe p, but the reason may be deliberative rather than 
theoretical.
We have looked at a  number of kinds of deliberative reasons: an 
experience, an intuition, trust in myself, trust in others, admiration. The 
first two have a  third person analogue that is a  theoretical reason. The 
fact that someone had an experience, and the fact that someone has an 
intuition can be treated by anybody as a theoretical reason to believe p. 
trust and admiration are different. The fact that you trust something or 
admire someone is not a theoretical reason. It is not the kind of reason 
that can be put out on the table for all to consider in favor of the truth of 
some proposition. It may, however, be a deliberative reason.
1.2.
There are important differences between theoretical and deliberative 
reasons that require us to think of them in distinct categories. First, 
deliberative reasons and theoretical reasons do not aggregate. That 
follows from the first person character of deliberative reasons and the 
third person character of theoretical reasons. They cannot aggregate 
because nobody has figured out how to put the first person and third 
6 The fact that there are theoretical reasons to admire someone in the domain of her 
believing p is not sufficient to give me a theoretical reason to believe p because reasons 
are not transitive. If A is a reason for b and b is a reason for C, it does not follow that A is 
a reason for C. So if A is a set of theoretical reasons to admire Sarah, and admiring Sarah 
is a reason to imitate her in believing p, it does not follow that theoretical reasons A gives 
me reason to believe p.
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person points of view together. Deliberative reasons neither increase nor 
decrease the theoretical case for some proposition p. my deliberative 
reasons are not facts of the universe that affect the theoretical case for 
p, and I can grasp that even if I am the one giving the theoretical case. 
So suppose I am giving the case for the proposition that driving while 
talking on a  mobile phone is dangerous. I  would point to the studies 
by reliable researchers that show that people who talk on the phone 
while driving have reduced peripheral vision, slower response time, and 
a higher accident rate than people who do not, but I would not add that 
I  trust the people who did the studies and they believe its conclusion 
(studies of that sort rarely even mention the personal conclusion drawn 
by the researchers). The fact that people I trust believe what they believe 
or have certain epistemic qualities does not make the relationship 
between the data in the studies and the conclusion stronger. to refer to 
it when giving the evidence linking mobile phone use and auto safety is 
beside the point. If driving while on the phone is dangerous, it does not 
matter what anybody anywhere thinks about it. of course, I might cite 
my experience while driving on the phone as a reason for me to believe 
it is unsafe, and you could cite the fact that I had that experience when 
giving your theoretical reasons for the same conclusion. but when you 
cite the fact that I had the experience as a theoretical reason for believing 
that talking on the phone while driving is unsafe, you are not referring to 
the same thing to which I refer when I cite my experience.
Although deliberative reasons and theoretical reasons do not 
aggregate, they are both kinds of reasons to think some proposition is 
true. together they can increase or decrease my confidence that p. So 
if I  believe p based on theoretical reasons and then find out that you 
believe p too, that increases my confidence that p. but while it is true that 
finding out that you believe p increases my confidence in myself in the 
way I come to believe p, and therefore increases my confidence in p, it is 
not additional theoretical evidence for p. If we were listing the facts of the 
universe that indicate the dangers of driving on the phone, we would not 
list the people who believe that it is dangerous.
reasons do not aggregate in the other direction either. I might believe 
p because of deliberative reasons – say, it is because I  epistemically 
trust you and you believe p. Then I get a piece of evidence that p and 
that increases my confidence that p. In that case it might appear that 
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the theoretical reason increases the force of my deliberative reason; 
it increases my trust in you. but that also is a mistake. Getting a piece of 
evidence for p does not support my trust in you when you believe p. It 
shows that your conclusion is more likely to be correct, and so I am more 
confident in p, but even if I got heaps of evidence for p, that should not 
increase my confidence that you are trustworthy in the way you came to 
your belief p. I could get evidence that you are trustworthy, but that is not 
part of the theoretical case for p. It is part of the theoretical case that you 
are trustworthy.
I  am not claiming that the beliefs of others cannot be treated as 
evidence. I  could get evidence that you are reliable in some domain 
and evidence that you have a belief in that domain. That would give me 
a theoretical reason to have the belief. It could be put out on the table 
as inductive evidence for the truth of the belief. That is not the same as the 
trust I have in you that can give me a deliberative reason to believe what 
you believe or what you tell me. I have described trust as a state that is 
partly epistemic and partly affective, and trust in others arises because it 
is a commitment of my attitude towards myself. A judgment of reliability 
is a third person judgment that involves nothing about personal relations 
or agency. In a judgment of reliability a person is treated no differently 
than a thermometer or a calculator. 
Theoretical reasons aggregate with each other since they are third-
personal. Deliberative reasons can affect other deliberative reasons, but 
your deliberative reasons do not aggregate with mine. Nonetheless, your 
deliberative reasons can affect mine. If I trust you and you tell me that 
you trust someone else or some authoritative body, I might take that as 
a reason to trust that person or body. but if I do not trust you and you tell 
me you trust yourself or someone else, your trust is irrelevant to me. Your 
deliberative reasons are relevant to me only in so far as they connect with 
my deliberative reasons. 
There is another interesting difference between theoretical reasons 
and deliberative reasons. I have no control at all over the relation between 
theoretical reasons for p and p, but I  exercise executive control over 
deliberative reasons. It is because of my deliberative reasons that what 
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I believe is up to me.7 I am not suggesting that deliberative reasons are 
voluntary, but my agency is involved in deliberative reasons, whereas it 
is irrelevant to theoretical reasons. by the nature of deliberative reasons, 
they connect me and the exercise of my reflective faculties with the aim 
I have in exercising those faculties in the domain of belief. For present 
purposes I  am assuming the aim is truth, although we can also have 
deliberative reasons to think that our faculties connect us to other 
epistemic ends such as understanding.
to summarize what I have said so far:
 - Theoretical reasons are 3rd personal, deliberative reasons are 1st 
personal.
 - Theoretical reasons have no essential connection to belief; 
deliberative reasons are essentially connected to my deliberations 
about what to believe.
 - Theoretical and deliberative reasons do not aggregate. Deliberative 
reasons for me to believe p do not increase the theoretical case 
for  p. Theoretical reasons for p do not increase my deliberative 
reasons for believing p. 
 - There are deliberative reasons that are always more basic than any 
theoretical reasons I can identify.
 - I  have no control over theoretical reasons, whereas deliberative 
reasons are reasons for me as an agent and I use them as an agent. 
both theoretical and deliberative reasons are reasons, and they are 
truth-directed. They are epistemic, not practical. Theoretical reasons are 
facts that support the truth of the proposition p. Deliberative reasons are 
reasons that support my believing p in so far as my aim is truth. They are 
reasons that support my believing p rather than your believing p. both 
deliberative reasons and the theoretical reasons I  identify increase my 
confidence in my belief p.
The distinction I  am proposing is not the same as the distinction 
between first order and second order epistemic reasons. There are 
both first order and second order theoretical reasons and first order 
and second order deliberative reasons. As I have said, the fact that an 
7 For a different kind of defense of the position that what I believe is “up to me,” see 
richard moran in Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge (Princeton 
university Press, 2001).
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experience occurred is a first order theoretical reason for various beliefs; 
the experience is a first order deliberative reason. The fact that a certain 
person is reliable is a second order theoretical reason to believe what she 
believes; my epistemic trust in that person is a second order deliberative 
reason. 
The distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons in 
ethics is closer to the distinction I am drawing here.8 There are different 
ways to characterize agent-relative reasons, but sometimes an agent-
relative reason is treated as a reason other persons can have, but it has 
a  different force for the agent than for others. For example, everyone 
has a reason to prevent murders, but the agent has a special reason not 
to commit a murder herself. In contrast, what I mean by a deliberative 
reason is a reason only a certain person can have.9 
 In addition, agent-relative reasons are generally treated as reasons 
that, while applying in a special way to a particular agent, are reasons for 
that agent because of some general principle. In this way of looking at 
reasons, agent-relative reasons are recognizable by persons other than the 
agent as reasons for that agent independent of the agent’s deliberations. 
So, for example, my agent-relative reason not to commit a  murder is 
not dependent upon my view of the matter. everyone knows in advance 
that I  have such a  reason, and it is not up to me whether that reason 
applies to me. In contrast, I  have proposed that deliberative reasons 
are connected with the agent’s agency, and it is possible that whether 
something is a deliberative reason for her in some situation is up to her. 
8 Thomas Nagel is generally credited with introducing a  form of this distinction in 
The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton: Princeton university Press, 1970), where he 
distinguished subjective and objective reasons for action. Derek Parfit introduced the 
terms “agent-relative” and “agent-neutral” reasons in Reasons and Persons (oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1984), and Nagel subsequently adopted this usage. For an overview 
of different approaches to this distinction and their respective merits, see michael 
ridge, “reasons for Action: Agent-Neutral vs. Agent-relative,” Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries). 
9 Derek Parfit refers to this difference as the difference between Nagel’s distinction and 
his own very similar distinction. Parfit says: “Nagel’s subjective reasons are reasons only 
for the agent. I call these agent-relative. When I call some reason agent-relative, I am not 
claiming that this reason cannot be a reason for other agents. All that I am claiming is 
that it may not be.” (Parfit, 1984, p. 143). In this respect my distinction is more like Nagel’s 
than Parfit’s. 
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That is a substantive claim about deliberative reasons that might not affect 
the way the distinction is made, so perhaps the terminology of agent-
relative and agent-neutral epistemic reasons is an appropriate usage for 
the distinction I  have described in this paper. I  have no objections to 
using that terminology, provided that the differences between my way of 
characterizing the two kinds of reasons and its usage by other authors is 
recognized.
II. APPlYING tHe DIStINCtIoN to ProblemS IN relIGIouS 
ePIStemoloGY
2.1.
The distinction between theoretical and deliberative reasons makes it 
easier to understand a number of epistemic phenomena. First, it explains 
the puzzle of how experience can be a  reason for belief, the enduring 
problem of the foundation of empirical knowledge. The problem is that 
the relation between my experience and a proposition I come to believe 
based on that experience is different in kind from the relation between one 
of my beliefs and another. There is no way to solve this problem by turning 
experiences into facts or propositional beliefs in an attempt to make all 
reasons theoretical. The fact that I have a certain sensory experience of 
seeing yellow gives me a theoretical reason to believe there is something 
yellow there, but my grasp of the fact that I have the experience of seeing 
yellow must itself be justified by the experience of seeing yellow. The 
foundation of empirical knowledge is not a propositional belief, much 
less some neutral fact about the universe, but something of an entirely 
different kind, and the relation between an instance of that kind and 
a propositional belief differs qualitatively from the relation between one 
propositional belief and another. 
The distinction between two kinds of epistemic reasons can be used 
to explain this difference. An experience is a deliberative reason for the 
person who has the experience to form certain beliefs. Those beliefs then 
give her theoretical reasons to form certain other beliefs when she grasps 
the relation between those reasons and what they are reasons for. Since 
we already know that the link between experience and belief has to be 
different in kind from the link between one belief and another, we seek 
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an explanation for the difference, and the difference between first person 
and third person reasons gives us such an explanation. 
This distinction is important for the rationality of religious belief 
based on religious experience. A religious experience gives the subject 
an irreducibly first person reason for belief, one that differs qualitatively 
from the relation between the fact that the experience occurred and 
a belief it supports, a relation to which anyone has access, in principle. 
The distinction between the two kinds of reasons is particularly 
important for religious experience because religious experience may be 
uncommon within a  population, and that makes it difficult for many 
people to access the fact that a religious experience has occurred. It is not 
unreasonable for someone to be skeptical about the evidential support 
given to a religious belief by the fact that someone else had a religious 
experience if experiences of that kind are qualitatively different from 
any experiences that person has had. We usually think that a  religious 
experience is a  stronger reason for religious belief for the person who 
has the experience than for other persons, but I think it is important to 
recognize a qualitative difference, not merely a difference in degree. In 
my opinion, discussion of religious experience as grounds for religious 
belief is advanced by focusing on the way deliberative reasons operate 
in a rational person. The process is very different when the only relevant 
reasons are theoretical.
2.2.
The distinction between the two kinds of reasons also makes it easier 
to understand the practice of testimony, which can be interpreted either 
as giving the recipient a  theoretical reason for a belief or as giving her 
a  deliberative reason. most of the literature on testimony treats it as 
giving the recipient a  theoretical reason. According to the reductionist 
model, the recipient makes an inductive inference from the evidence that 
a testifier is reliable in the relevant domain and that she has testified that 
p, to the conclusion that p. Anything can be treated as evidence, and there 
is nothing preventing a person from making such an inference. When she 
does so, she has a third person reason to believe what another persons 
says. many so-called non-reductionists also see testimony as giving the 
subject evidence for belief, only they think the evidence is direct rather 
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than inferential.10 In these evidence models, the testifier is treated the 
same way we treat a computer or a clock. The testifier gives anybody in 
similar circumstances a reason to believe the testimony. 
but given what I have said, I cannot consistently treat other persons 
as simply sources of evidence (theoretical reasons) for me. It is because 
of trust in myself that I must trust them. When I trust someone else and 
they believe in a way I trust, I have a deliberative reason to believe the 
same thing. The person I  trust may tell me what she believes in a way 
that expresses an intention that I believe it too. When she does so, she 
is asking me for trust, and if I grant it, I come to believe what she tells 
me on her word. There is a relationship between the testifier and myself 
in which each of us plays a role. The testifier assures me, the recipient, 
that p is true and that she has taken the responsibility to make the belief 
justified (or in my preferred terminology, epistemically conscientious). 
I rely upon her for the conscientious formation of the belief and defer 
to her if challenged.11 Since telling involves an interpersonal relationship 
on this model, there is a sense in which belief on testimony is within the 
control of the recipient. The evidence view of testimony cannot explain 
that. The evidential view makes it a  mystery how asking for trust and 
granting it can provide a reason for anybody to believe something. It does 
not seem to be in the right category to be a reason for belief.12 but we can 
see why the evidence view of testimony exists. It is the view a person is 
forced to have if the only epistemic reasons she recognizes are theoretical. 
10 This is a  point made by benjamin mcmyler, Testimony, Trust, and Authority, 
forthcoming, oxford university Press, 2011, chaps 2 and 3. mcmyler argues that 
testimony gives the recipient a second-person reason to believe what is testified. I have 
no objection to calling trust in others a second person epistemic reason for belief. trust 
in you as a  reason to believe something includes an irreducible reference to me. The 
important point for my argument here is that trust in others is clearly distinguishable 
from theoretical reasons, and it has the properties of first person, deliberative reasons.
11 This model is close to the Assurance model of testimony of richard moran, “Getting 
told and being believed,” in The Epistemology of Testimony, edited by J. lackey and e. 
Sosa (oxford university Press, 2005), pp. 272-306.
12 As richard moran says, it seems as if my recognizing the speaker’s intention ought 
to be pointless. It does not add to my evidence as interpreter to learn that in addition to 
his believing p, the speaker also has the intention that I should believe p. See “Getting 
told and being believed,” p. 15. moran mentions Paul Grice’s much earlier use of that 
point.
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The interpretation of the practice of testimony is important for 
religious epistemology because divine revelation is testimony from 
God. on the evidence model of testimony, divine testimony gives the 
recipient either direct or inferential evidence for the content of the 
testimony. So belief on revelation can be interpreted as based on an 
inference that the source of some putative revelation is divine and hence 
reliable, the position of John locke.13 Alternatively, divine testimony 
can be interpreted as direct evidence for the content of the testimony. 
Anti-reductionists about testimony typically follow Thomas reid, who 
thought of belief on testimony as directly justified in the way he thought 
perceptual beliefs are directly justified by perceptual experience. on this 
model, the recipient of divine testimony has direct evidence for the truth 
of the testimony. Notice that the adherent of this approach agrees with 
locke that a revelatory event is evidence for the recipient. The difference 
is that this view makes the evidence non-inferential, whereas locke 
makes it inferential.
 but if central cases of testimony give the recipient deliberative rather 
than theoretical reasons for belief, it seems to me that revelation should 
be treated differently. The ground of belief in revelation is trust in God, 
and that gives me a  deliberative reason to believe what God tells me. 
When God tells me that p, God takes responsibility for the truth of p for 
me and for all other intended recipients of his revelation. God intends 
that I believe him, and he acknowledges that we who are the recipients 
place epistemic trust in him by believing him. our responsibility is to 
trust appropriately. It is God’s responsibility to make the belief true. 
There are a  number of different ways trust can be an appropriate 
deliberative reason to believe testimony from God. Some people’s trust 
is grounded in other deliberative reasons such as religious experience or 
the admiration they have for the Scriptural message.
my view is that trust in another person is justified by my conscientious 
judgment that trusting that person will survive my own conscientious 
13 See locke, “of Faith and reason, and Their Distinct Provinces,” in Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding, bk. IV, Ch. 18, Sec. 7. See also locke’s posthumously published 
essay, “A Discourse of miracles.”
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self-reflection.14 believing a  person who is currently speaking to me 
or who has written a book or sent me an email is not very mysterious, 
but believing God requires a  theory of revelation to explain how 
communication between God and me can succeed. my point here is not 
to give a theory of revelation, but to point out that a theory of revelation 
must respect the way in which testimony operates between two persons. 
If testimony involves a personal request for trust and a granting of trust, 
that element must be a component of an account of divine revelation.
2.3.
The distinction between theoretical and deliberative reasons also helps 
us avoid confusion in framing the currently popular topic of reasonable 
disagreement. Suppose I believe p and you believe not p. We get together 
and compare our evidence, so now we have all the same evidence. our 
evidence can include the facts that we have each had certain experiences. 
We now have the same theoretical reasons. A problem arises when, in 
addition to the evidence on the table, I know that you believe not p and 
I trust you in the way you acquired your belief not p. I now seem to have 
a weaker case for p than I had before.
This situation is not especially problematic if we think of the conflict 
as arising within one’s theoretical reasons. Theoretical reasons may or 
may not include facts about people’s beliefs. let us suppose first that 
they do. The issue, then, is that one reliable person who happens to 
be me believes  p, but another reliable person who happens to be you 
believes not p. This conflict is no different than the conflict that arises 
when neither of the persons with conflicting beliefs is myself. It is the 
common problem of a clash in evidence, and it is presumably resolved 
by awaiting more evidence. In any case, there is no special problem when 
the disagreement between myself and another is interpreted as this sort 
of conflict within theoretical reasons.
There is another way the person who sees the problem as a conflict 
within theoretical reasons can look at the situation. They might exclude 
from the evidence the fact that the believers have the beliefs they have. 
The idea is that persons are simply conduits for communicating evidence 
14I defend this idea as the ground for epistemic trust and belief on the authority of 
individuals and communities in Epistemic Authority, cited in note 3. 
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to each other. once the evidence is on the table, it does not matter what 
anybody believes. What someone believes is a  fact about what they do 
with the evidence; it is not evidence. It might appear that we are forced to 
draw this conclusion because we do not treat our own belief as evidence. 
If I am considering the case for and against p, once I start to believe p, 
I do not think that then I have additional evidence for p. my believing 
p does not increase my theoretical case for p. but if my believing p has 
no effect on the case for p, your believing p should have no effect either. 
What people believe is not part of the theoretical reasons for belief. on 
this approach disagreement is not a problem.
If the only reasons for belief are theoretical, then, disagreement 
is a  problem of evidence pointing in conflicting directions, which is 
not mysterious or surprising, or it is no problem at all. but reasonable 
people do experience their disagreement with other reasonable people 
as a problem, and it is necessary to explain that. Suppose I believe p and 
I have certain theoretical reasons upon which I base my belief. As I have 
argued, my confidence in p is not determined solely by those reasons 
because those reasons by themselves are not sufficient to justify me in 
believing p in a non-circular way. I must also trust that my faculties have 
properly handled the evidence, which means not only that I have figured 
out the correct logical and probabilistic relations between the evidence 
and p, but that I  appreciate the significance of individual pieces of 
evidence, and that I have not left anything out. I need to trust that I have 
used my faculties well and have the relevant intellectual virtues. but given 
that my confidence in my belief p depends upon the above, and given that 
my trust in myself commits me to trust others who are relevantly like 
myself, the fact that someone else who is relevantly like me believes not p 
gives me a reason to trust his belief not p and to distrust my belief p. The 
problem of reasonable disagreement is therefore a  problem that arises 
among my deliberative reasons. 
When we consider deliberative reasons for belief, that gives us 
a different response to the argument that your belief should not count 
as evidence for me unless mine does also. If a belief is formed in a way 
I trust, that does give me a deliberative reason to believe it. The perhaps 
surprising conclusion that if I form a belief p in a way I trust, that gives 
me a deliberative reason to (continue to) believe p, just as your believing 
not p in a  way I  trust gives me a  deliberative reason to believe not p. 
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The objector who claims that your belief does not give me a reason to 
believe anything unless mine does also is correct. There is a symmetry 
between your belief and mine as reasons for belief. Neither belief gives 
me a  theoretical reason to believe. both beliefs give me a  deliberative 
reason to believe. The problem of disagreement arises when I trust both 
myself and someone else who has a conflicting belief. 
religious disagreement was recognized as a  problem for religious 
belief well before the topic of reasonable disagreement drew attention 
from epistemologists. What people did not do was to reason as follows: 
I and my co-religionists are reliable people and we believe p. The believers 
in these other religions are also reliable people and they believe not p. If 
that was what they were thinking, the conflict in their evidence would 
not have been very interesting, as I said. but people also did not take the 
other approach to disagreement within theoretical reasons mentioned 
above. That is, they did not say that the conflicting beliefs of other people 
are irrelevant because beliefs are not evidence. They were presumably 
worried about something else. many people found that their experiences 
of close association with persons in other religious communities led them 
to place a substantial amount of trust in those persons, and consequently 
in their beliefs. They interpreted their trust in those others as giving them 
a reason to believe what the others believed, a reason that conflicted with 
the reasons they already had to believe in their own religion due to trust in 
themselves. It is very difficult to explain why this kind of experience leads 
to a clash of reasons for belief unless we are talking about deliberative 
reasons.
2.4.
The difference between theoretical and deliberative reasons also explains 
the primary feature of acting or believing on authority. According to 
Joseph raz, the distinguishing feature of authoritative directives is that 
they give the subject a pre-emptive reason to obey the authority, where 
a pre-emptive reason is a reason that replaces the subject’s other reasons 
for and against performing the act. For instance, if I stop at a red light 
on the authority of the law, then the fact that the law requires me to 
stop is my reason for stopping, a reason that replaces any other reasons 
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I have for and against stopping at the light.15 I will not argue here that 
acting on authority in this way can be justified. my point is only that 
acting on authority is something people do, and what they are doing is 
to treat their reasons for acting as the authority dictates in a certain way, 
one in which the authority’s directive becomes the reason for the act, 
replacing other reasons. but it is very hard to see how one reason can 
replace another when both reasons are theoretical. In order to let one 
reason replace others, I,  the subject, must take the authority’s directive 
as having a certain force for me. I am free to take it as authoritative or 
not. I therefore exercise the executive function of an agent when I act on 
authority. my reason to do so must therefore be deliberative.
I  argue that the same point applies to believing on authority as to 
acting on authority. my position is that the belief or testimony of another 
person whom I conscientiously take to be more trustworthy than myself 
in some domain can give me a pre-emptive reason to believe what the 
authority believes or testifies.16 The distinction between theoretical and 
deliberative reasons makes it easier to see how this can happen. The fact 
that the authority has a  belief p pre-empts my theoretical reasons for 
and against p. but pre-emption seems strange if all epistemic reasons are 
theoretical.
The rationality of taking religious beliefs on authority gets very little 
attention in religious epistemology and I would like to see that change. 
I believe that it can be reasonable to take a religious belief pre-emptively 
out of trust in a religious authority. my reason to take a belief on authority 
is deliberative. It depends upon a  certain connection between the 
authority and myself, and I exercise the control of an agent when I do so. 
The erosion of trust in authority in modern life includes the loss of 
reasons to believe or act as the authority directs. religious communities 
have much to contribute to our understanding of building and rebuilding 
the relationships that give persons deliberative reasons to trust authority. 
In fact, religious communities may be the most important kind of 
community in which trust in persons with whom one lacks a  direct 
relationship still exists. I propose that an investigation of the reasons why 
members of religious communities accept authority in their community 
15 Joseph raz, The Morality of Freedom (oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).
16 I argue for this view in Epistemic Authority, chap. 5.
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will lead nowhere if we expect the reasons to be theoretical, but will be 
enlightening if we attend to deliberative reasons.
2.5.
Finally, I think that conversion cannot be explained except by deliberative 
reasons. rarely does anyone convert to a religion because of theoretical 
reasons he did not previously have. but conversion is sometimes the 
reasonable thing to do. trust or admiration for another person or for 
a tradition or for the sacred texts of a religion is typically the reason for 
conversion, not just the cause. The fact that conversion can be reasonable 
is very difficult to explain without reference to deliberative reasons. of 
course, someone who maintains that the only kind of epistemic reasons 
are theoretical will deny that it is ever rational to change one’s epistemic 
stance towards a  proposition (belief, disbelief, withholding belief) 
when one’s apprehension and evaluation of the theoretical reasons do 
not change, but my purpose in this paper is not to convince anyone of 
the rationality of conversion. I  mention conversion as an example of 
a  phenomenon of change of belief that many people do find rational, 
which deserves more attention in the literature, and which I conjecture 
cannot be explained except by reference to deliberative reasons.17
CoNCluSIoN
In this paper I  have proposed that distinguishing first person from 
third person epistemic reasons permits us to get a better understanding 
of some important problems in epistemology in general and religious 
epistemology in particular. The problems I  have mentioned have 
something in common. They reveal the way human agency operates 
in the attempt to get the truth, not just in human action in the overt 
sense of action. The nature of the self and its executive power to manage 
17 For a classic historical account of the rise of conversion as a phenomenon in the 
West, see A.D. Nock, Conversion (baltimore, mD: John Hopkins university Press, 1998). 
Nock argues that in the ancient world people could be converted to philosophies such as 
Pythagoreanism, Platonism, epircureanism, and Stoicism, but not to the ancient Greek 
or roman religions. Conversion became important with the rise of Christianity because 
Christianity included answers to the ultimate questions posed by philosophers, yet it was 
also in competition with pagan religion since it required people to make a choice.
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itself is such a difficult problem, it is unsurprising that epistemologists 
often prefer to bracket it off from the problems of direct interest to 
epistemology. but if I am right, we cannot do that without distorting the 
relationship between epistemic reasons and what they are reasons for. 
What I reasonably take to be reasons to believe some proposition p is not 
identical to the neutral facts that any reasonable person would take to be 
reasons supporting p. but as a reasonable person I must figure out how to 
combine theoretical and deliberative reasons in my epistemic psychology 
in a way that gives me a determinate answer to the question whether p. 
It is particularly important that we do not ignore the distinction between 
the two kinds of reasons in the domain of religious belief since religious 
belief is a particular person’s answer to her own religious questions, yet 
its content is also the property of all reasonable persons in their common 
attempt to find the truth.
